This paper surveys the relationship between Clergy Vocational Conflict, cognitive conflict and psychological well-being in a sample of 178 Muslim clergy in Turkey. It was found that Clergy Vocational Conflict is accompanied by religious conflict and Quest. Those who experienced Clergy Vocational Conflict and religious conflict suffered from poor psychological well-being. Quest, which does not affect psychological well-being, and religious conflict, which adversely affects it, are more common among the younger stratum of the sample. However, well-being prevails among the older (...) layer and among the more educated clergy. Finally, psychological well-being, self-esteem, Quest and religious conflict were found as predictors for Clergy Vocational Conflict. (shrink)

It is now widely accepted that astronomical factors trigger the emergence of glacial and interglacial periods. However, nearly two centuries ago, the overall situation was not as apparent as it is today. In this article, I briefly discuss the astronomical model of ice ages put forward in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This period was indeed anni mirabiles for scientists to understand the ice age phenomenon. Agassiz, Adhémar and Croll laid the foundation stones for understanding the dynamics of ice (...) ages. But it was Milankovitch who combined empirical geology with mathematical astronomy. Specifically, he identified the shortcomings of the preceding ice age models and modified his model accordingly. In what follows, I review earlier approaches to the ice age problem and show how they failed to meet their objectives. Next, I show how Milankovitch's model managed to capture all sufficient astronomical elements. The final sections focus on Milutin Milankovitch's successful approach, including his accomplishment of tackling the problem mathematically. (shrink)

Abstract: Before now it is believe that it is only company that their activities adversely affect the environment that should be socially responsible. This has change over the years as some country has made it mandatory for business to be socially responsible without which they cannot do business. For insurance company, their activities have to do with rendering of services and as such do not destroy the environment. The main objective of the study was to determine corporate social responsibility accounting (...) and financial performance of insurance companies in Nigeria. The research design adopted for the study is expo facto research design. The population of the study consists of all the 40 companies quoted in the Nigeria Stock Exchange as at December 2016. A sample of 25 insurance companies was selected base on their size from the population of the insurance companies. Data for the study were obtained from annual reports for the period of ten (10) years ranging from 2007 to 2016. Multiple regression analysis was carried out to determine the desire relationship. Findings show a significant relationship between corporate social responsibility accounting and return on capital employed and net profit margin, while a negative relationship with earnings per share. The implication of the findings is that there is evidence of conscious effort of the sampled insurance companies to discharge their social responsibility. The study recommends among other that management should be proactive and ensure that their social responsibility policies are adequately implemented, and ensure that Nigerian companies comply with government laws regarding business regulation in the country. (shrink)

Bu çalışma, dağarcık ağı tekniği kullanılarak, Türkiye'deki 20 Müslüman ilâhiyat öğretim görevlisinin?gerçek' Müslümanların arzu edilir vasışarı ile ilgili bilişsel kurgularını ortaya koyma denemesidir. Verilerin faktör analizi ve diğer istatistikî yöntem ve teknikler, öğretim görevlilerinin arzu edilen Müslüman niteliklerini temsil eden 200 bilişsel kurgusuna ve bunlardan da 18 bilişsel kurgu grubuna ulaşılmasını sağlamıştır. Bu 18 nitelikler grubu "Diğerkâmlık"tan "Sıkı Çalışkanlık"a ve "Bilişsel Dindarlık"tan "Samimiyet"e kadar dindarlıkla ilgili çeşitli konuları kapsamaktadır. Bu gruplardan önemli olanları, diğerkâmlık, bilişsel dindarlık, dürüstlük ve samimiyet, içtenlik olarak (...) ortaya çıkmıştır. Yazarlar, bu şekilde algılanan İslâmî dindarlık niteliklerinin modern çoğulcu toplumların değer yargılarıyla uzlaşma içinde olup olmadıklarını değerlendirdiler. (shrink)

That Descartes’ God is not a deceiver is amongst the canonical claims of early modern philosophy. The significance of this (purported) fact to the coherence of Descartes’ system is likewise canonical, infused in how we teach and think about the _Meditations_. Though prevalent, both ends of this narrative are suspect. We argue that Descartes’ color eliminativism, when coupled with his analysis of the cognitive structure of our sensory systems, entails that God is a deceiver. It’s doubtful that Descartes recognized this, (...) given his insistence that God is not a deceiver, and the role this plays in his system. But this is a concession Descartes can grant if we are careful about the kind of deception at play—a kind Descartes _does_ recognize, albeit not without some ambiguity. On our story, Descartes’ metaphysics and epistemology are not driven by concerns about deception _per se_, but by concerns about God’s _benevolence_. (shrink)

Political protests, debates on college campuses, and social media tirades make it seem like everyone is speaking their minds today. Surveys, however, reveal that many people increasingly feel like they're walking on eggshells when communicating in public. Speaking your mind can risk relationships and professional opportunities. It can alienate friends and anger colleagues. Isn't it smarter to just put your head down and keep quiet about controversial topics? In this book, Hrishikesh Joshi offers a novel defense of speaking your mind. (...) He explains that because we are social creatures, we never truly think alone. What we know depends on what our community knows. And by bringing our unique perspectives to bear upon public discourse, we enhance our collective ability to reach the truth on a variety of important matters. Speaking your mind is also important for your own sake. It is essential for developing your own thinking. And it's a core aspect of being intellectually courageous and independent. Joshi argues that such independence is a crucial part of a well-lived life. The book draws from Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, Bertrand Russell, and a range of contemporary thinkers to argue that it's OK to speak your mind. Key Features Shows that we have not just a right but a moral duty to publicly share what we know. Argues that discussing your unique ideas with others is essential for developing as a critical thinker. Explores the value of intellectual honesty and independence in the writings of John Stuart Mill and Friedrich Nietzsche and connects their thinking to contemporary problems. Argues that avoiding cultural blind spots today is important for the fate of future generations. (shrink)

Can we make mistakes about what rationality requires? A natural answer is that we can, since it is a platitude that rational belief does not require truth; it is possible for a belief to be rational and mistaken, and this holds for any subject matter at all. However, the platitude causes trouble when applied to rationality itself. The possibility of rational mistakes about what rationality requires generates a puzzle. When combined with two further plausible claims – the enkratic principle, and (...) the claim that rational requirements apply universally – we get the result that rationality generates inconsistent requirements. One popular and attractive solution to the puzzle denies that it is possible to make rational mistakes about what rationality requires. I show why (contra Titelbaum (2015b), and Littlejohn (2015)) this solution is doomed to fail. (shrink)

Sometimes we make mistakes, even when we try to do our best. When those mistakes are about normative matters, such as what is required, this leads to a puzzle. This puzzle arises from the possibility of misleading evidence about what rationality requires. I argue that the best way to solve this puzzle is to distinguish between two kinds of evaluation: requirement and appraisal. The strategy I defend connects three distinct debates in epistemology, ethics, and normativity: the debate over how our (...) theories of epistemic rationality should accommodate misleading evidence, the debate over the relationship between complying with requirements and deserving particular appraisals, and the debate over whether normative ignorance can excuse. Part 1 shows how three apparently plausible claims about epistemic rationality generate a puzzle when agents have misleading evidence about what rationality requires. Part 2 solves this puzzle by distinguishing between evaluations of requirement and appraisal and rejecting the idea that one is required to conform to the Enkratic Principle. I argue instead that complying with the Enkratic Principle provides defeasible evidence that the agent should be positively appraised. One of the consequences of this solution is that false normative beliefs can sometimes excuse agents from negative appraisal they would otherwise deserve for violating requirements. Part 3 defends the view that false normative belief can sometimes excuse against the rival views that false normative belief always excuses, and that false normative belief never excuses. I argue that false normative belief can sometimes excuse violations of requirements, when it is the case that the agent has done what it is reasonable to expect of her. (shrink)

There is a widely held view on measurement inferences, that goes back to Stevens’s ([1946]) theory of measurement scales and ‘permissible statistics’. This view defends the following prohibition: you should not make inferences from averages taken with ordinal scales (versus quantitative scales: interval or ratio). This prohibition is general—it applies to all ordinal scales—and it is sometimes endorsed without qualification. Adhering to it dramatically limits the research that the social and biomedical sciences can conduct. I provide a Bayesian analysis of (...) this inferential problem, determining when measurements from ordinal scales can be used to confirm hypotheses about relative group averages. The prohibition, I conclude, cannot be upheld, even in a qualified sense. The beliefs needed to make average comparisons are less demanding than those appropriate for quantitative scales. I illustrate with the alleged paradigm ordinal scale, Mohs’ scale of mineral hardness, arguing that the literature has mischaracterized it. (shrink)

Abstract A Note to Cogito Les Jones Blackburn College Previous submissions include -Intention, interpretation and literary theory, a first lookWittgenstein and St Augustine A DiscussionAreas of Interest – History of Western Philosophy, Miscellaneous Philosophy, European A Note on Cogito Descartes' brilliance in driving out doubt, and proving the existence of himself as a thinking entity, is well documented. Sartre's critique (or maybe extension) is both apposite and grounded and takes these enquiries on to another level. Let's take a look. 'I (...) think' somehow, for all its power, lacks something. What? Consider what one does when thinking (difficult, but we can try). Implicit in the word 'think', in fact the very essence of the word 'think', is that activity is going on, and if such activity is going on then it must be going on about something, an object, an emotion, a problem,or maybe some dreamlike state, but common to all these is that something is going on. Is that really so? Well, if that wasn't so we would be able to think in a pure state, wouldn't we? But what does a pure state of 'thinking' mean? It can't mean that there isnothing there, because if there were nothing there then no thinking would be taking place. Can it mean that we are thinking of nothing? Well no, because if we are thinking of nothing then we are thinking of something, we are contemplating the notion, or the nature, of nothing. In fact, one can argue that if we talk of something, inthis case nothing or nothingness, then in our head we have some notion of what that is, i.e. something exists in the mind for it to come out of our mouths. Thinking is a recognition of something outside the individual, for the very act of direction, which isan indispensable part of thinking, recognises, must recognise, that there are things to address outside the individual. Something else to bear in mind. According to Sartre human beings are condemned to freedom. Why condemned? Human beings did not choose to be born, but the act ofbeing born also imparts the freedom of which Sartre speaks. Freedom is something which we parrot off as being a sine qua non for the human condition. I believe that's true, but freedom in this sense isn't without its consequences for the individual humanbeing, for individual human beings handle freedom differently. To some it enables them to fly, to others it imparts immense pressures, anguish, heartbreak, unhappiness can all be associated with such freedom. Each individual is responsible for his destiny, for his direction. If someone says that God impelled him, that individual chose his or her God, and chose to obey his or her God. This believer has to sift through the multitude of things that his or her God desire of him or her. All this is fine, so long as we acknowledge what is going on here. Belief in God is, by definition, a belief. Belief, following Wittgenstein, is a language game with its rules and its boundaries. The essential feature of religion as language game are its boundaries, which can be summed up in the word belief. OK, belief has its practises which are its constituent parts, but belief is the boundary between religion and other language games, as the proof constituents are different. Our world is determined by the language used to describe everything that goes on within it. The boundaries of our world are set by the language we use. This might be better put as language gives access to ever expending boundaries. Ever expanding boundaries are only possible by ever expanding thought, and ever expanding thought is only possible by ever expanding directions to our thought brought about through language. It is a fact taken that to be conscious is to think. How could this be otherwise? Consciousness without thought just does not make sense. Imagine a state of consciousness without directional thought. What would it be like? It would be something never experienced, completely out of our understanding. Why? Because understanding itself is a directional thought process. If we say we are going outside our understanding then that is a world of void, and a world of void does not exist. Can such a world be contemplated in our thinking? Well, yes, but then it requires thinking, and thinking requires direction, and such direction requires language. Why does direction require language? Because there is no other way for human beings to articulate a directional thought. Could one point at an image without language? Well, one could have an image in mind, but the essence of saying something about it, of descriptive power, brings us back to the essence, to the power of language to direct. So what of this language of which we speak? Wittgenstein's private language argument points us towards the notion that language itself constantly develops and redevelops through human interaction. Descarte's cogito implies that thinking rules out doubt of one's own existence. But such thinking, to be valid, to make sense, to direct, must develop in a language that has developed, has been verified, by a plurality, by a plurality whose essence is social. Correct use of language symbols, i.e. words, requires that we verify and reverify the accuracy of such symbols. How do we do that? We do that in constant usage, in constant interaction, with other human beings. An individual using a private language could not be understood by others, his symbol system has not been verified by others, his meanings may not be your meanings. It follows from what we have said above that language is constructed, and is continually constructed, in a social context. Given our previous thoughts regarding verification this could not be otherwise. Language has a normative form. All language users are required, by their very use of the language, to verify the use of terms, grammar etc etc. As Wittgenstein cites (appropriately) games as a model, let us take a look. If I play e.g. Ludo, I am governed by the rules. It is not just that I may play dishonestly, for if I were to play at all that very dishonesty, to count as Ludo, would have to be rule governed. The rules of Ludo are Ludo, they are the essence and the constitution of it. Wittgenstein, particularly in his later writings, interweaves many concepts, and connects them in different and sometimes rather elusive ways. Wittgenstein sees concepts like emotions, sentiments and experiences in these interweaving maps. Of course these can be regarded as psychological concepts ** Language can be considered in another but related way, as embodying the elements of a cultural heritage. Language was seen as embodying the notion of higher culture in the arts, architecture etc. Over recent decades this has tended to shift to consider less tangible benefits, such things as oral traditions, cultural values and cultural identity. So language enables us to explore, through the achievements of past generations, cultural mores that may have laid unchallenged for many years. Many of these values and mores may be seen as independent of the language by which they are transmitted, but still this monumental accomplishment of mankind i.e. language, enables man to explore, to modify, to codify, to extend the boundaries of human experience. There are therefore massive implications for our Note on Cogito of Wittgenstein's work. Following Wittgenstein emotions and other psychological concepts can be termed depth grammar, and are distinguished by the fact that the third person of the present is recognised by observation, the first person is not. Taking Wittgenstein's well known pain example the sentence 'He is in pain' is a third person statement of an observational nature. The sentence 'I am in pain' is not derived from observation but from experience, it is an expression of that experience, it's essence is the experience. The asymmetry consists in the fact that predicting psychological attributes of others is warranted by what they do and say. By contrast, the use of such statements in the first person present tense does not rest on one's observation of one's own behaviour. (Hacker 2010:287) p 9 According to Wittgenstein 'I am in pain' is more like a cry of pain, an expression of pain, than a report of some pain. Of course this appertains for other similar statements. 'I feel good' etc. (shrink)

In Why It's OK to Speak Your Mind, Hrishikesh Joshi argues that the open exchange of ideas is essential for the flourishing of individuals and society. He provides two arguments for this claim. First, speaking your mind is essential for the common good: we enhance our collective ability to reach the truth if we share evidence and offer different perspectives. Second, speaking your mind is good for your own sake: it is necessary to develop your rational faculties and exercise intellectual (...) independence, both of which are essential for living a good life. In this paper, I consider the implications of Joshi’s argument and raise several objections to his view. (shrink)

For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.

The Ontology of Knowledge (OK) states: The laws of the world cannot be distinguished from the laws by which representation emerges from intensional thought. The laws of a physical world in vis-à-vis are not necessary. The forms of the world resulting from these laws cannot be distinguished from the laws of thought. They have no object. (see appendix I) OK seems to make of Knowledge, the substance from which the subject gives rise for himself to a representation of the world (...) and himself. The OK is realistic in that it states that there is a reality, but it also states clearly that the Reality is informal and that there is no being in reality, no other beings than those created by the subject in representation. That justifies the title of this article: Would the knowing subject be, in fact, the only being in the world, all other beings being only representation? While the Cogito guarantees the Existence of the "I" that enunciates it, is there no other Me than this "I"? As much as our mind can consent to the idea that objects and material facts are only representations, including the atoms of our own body, as much as it seems absurd to us, paradoxical, contrary to the evidence of every moment, the idea that "I" would be the one and only knowing subject. The first part of this article proposes, by a clarification of concepts and terms, to answer specifically to the question of the existence of other “I's” The second part will try to widen the spectrum of our reflection to study, within the conceptual framework of the OK, the possibility of a supra-human thought/knowledge. Of a “Us” . (shrink)

For the OK, there is in fact no opposition between the logical and the material or the spiritual: reality is a formless logical substance. Representation is morphogenesis and the terms 'material' and 'spiritual' only denote categories of morphogenesis. Our constant experience shows us that spiritual and material interact. The border between understanding and becoming, between meaning and act, which seems trivial to us, is elusive when we try to approach it. For example: when the subject follows the object of his (...) attention with his gaze, where to draw the line between material and spiritual ? Representation is morphogenesis and the OK uses the term 'horizon', not to separate the material from the spiritual, but to distinguish the formless from the representable, the unspeakable from the speakable. For the OK the speakable is not 'something else' than the unspeakable, it is a mode of order: The rainbow is not 'an other thing' than rain, light, sun, the walk that brought me here and now, my sense of vision, my culture etc ... all this unspeakable set of logical interdependencies from which emerges, for me subject, the meaning of the rainbow. And above all, this horizon is not 'in my mind'. The ordaining of the unspeakable is not carried out 'by my understanding'. The emergence of the meaning from the unspeakable logic is not happening 'in' and 'by' my mind. On the contrary, it is a process of pure logic*, a progressive aglomeration of interdependance, which makes the subject emerge as a representation of the world and of his own existence. The logical transcends the Existing. This is the key to understanding this article: We have not left the Garden of Eden. The representation is not 'overhanging' the world, it is 'the' world. Representation is not "grasping form" but "morphogenesis", not as "attribution of form" but as "necessary ordering mode of logical reality". Common sense (including science and logic) does not represent reality, it emerges from it in the form of modes of order of reality, of logic. My representation of this white stone is not 'something else' than the unspeakable logic from which the meaning of 'white stone' emerges for me, it is only a mode of order. There are no "other things" than the things which represent themselves in me and which are modes of order. The Existing is representation. Existence is a mode of order *. The amorphous logical "substance" precedes (transcends) its representation. The logical transcends logic. (shrink)

The Ontology of Knowledge (OK) does not claim to expose the truth of reality but only to propose a coherent model of representation according to which: -Reality is not subject to form or time. -The Knowing Subject is a wave of meaning running through the immobile reality.

Miracle Max, it seems, is the only remaining miracle worker in all of Florin. Among other things, this means that he (unlike anyone else) can resurrect the recently dead, at least in certain circumstances. Max’s peculiar talents come with significant perks (for example, he can basically set his own prices!), but they also raise a number of ethical dilemmas that range from the merely amusing to the truly perplexing: -/- How much about Max’s “methods” does he need to reveal to (...) his patients? Is it really OK for Max to lie about Valerie’s being a witch, even though she really isn’t? Just how much of the “truth” does Max have to tell his patients? -/- Let’s suppose that Humperdinck had offered Max his old job back. Would it have been OK for Max to accept this offer? What about if Humperdinck wanted him to do experiments at “the Zoo”? -/- Is Max obligated to offer his services to everyone who needs them, such as the (mostly) dead Westley and friends? Or is he free to pick and choose? -/- In this chapter, I’ll consider how these questions might be addressed using concepts of medical ethics. As it turns out, Max’s dilemmas are not too different from the sorts of dilemmas that many medical professionals encounter in their daily lives, and exploring how Max could (or should) respond to them can help us figure out what we can do here in the “real” world. (shrink)

This paper aims to state the obvious – the commonsense, rational approach to child-producing. We have no general obligation to promote either the “general happiness” or the equalization of this and that. We have children if we want them, if their life prospects are decent – and if we can afford them, which is a considerable part of their life prospects being OK – and provided that in doing so we do not inflict injury on others. It’s extremely difficult to (...) do this latter, but affording them, in rich countries, is another matter. With that qualification, by and large people should just go ahead and have (or not have) children – as many as they think they want and can handle – as it suits them. (shrink)

The recent #metoo movement has turned public attention to the problem of sex under conditions of power inequality. Is consent impaired, when you have plenty to lose (e.g. a great professional opportunity) from saying “no” to a sexual advance? And even if consent is valid, is this a morally acceptable situation, especially if one party is aware that their position of relative power will influence the other’s decision to have sex? Such situations bring to the fore not only the issues (...) of coerced sex and quid pro quo harassment (asking for sex in exchange for benefits), but the much more controversial question of whether sex between unequal but otherwise competent consenting adult partners is in principle OK—and whether institutions such as companies, universities, or the state itself should be in the business of regulating such relations. In what follows, I will outline the central concept of power asymmetry and its ethical relevance (section 2). I will then distinguish two main views about the ethics of sexual interaction under conditions of power asymmetry: a Kantian view, which categorically condemns such interactions, and a Millian view, which justifies at least some such interactions (section 3). I then briefly consider three contexts, which raise difficult questions about sex between unequals: the workplace, the university (section 4), and voluntary prostitution (section 5). Section 6 provides a short conclusion. (shrink)

As in other branches of social sciences, many studies on altruism have been conducted in the field of psychology. Altruism, which is at the intersection point of social psychology, positive psychology and the psychology of religion, is based on the prioritization of the other rather than oneself. Providing a roadmap for social relations, religions glorifies altruistic behavior. For this reason, it has been accepted that there is a natural relationship between altruism and religious attachment. In this article, the relationship between (...) altruism and religious attitude is examined through university students from different departments. The study, which involves 334 undergraduate students, uses The Altruism Scale developed by Ümmet, Ekşi and Otrar (2013) and the Religious Attitude Scale developed by Ok (2011). As a result of the research, it is determined that there is a positive significant correlation (r =, 360, p <, 001) between the level of religiousness and altruism. When comparing the departments, the lowest level of altruism is found to be psychology (3.76), and the highest level to be theology (4.08). The field of health (3.98) and social and humanities (3.93) follow theology, respectively. According to the LSD test results, the differences between psychology and theology, health and social and humanities are significant. When analyzed in terms of sub-dimensions, a significant difference is found between the departments in "participation in voluntary activities", "financial assistance", "assistance in traumatic situations" and "assistance based on physical strength". There is no such difference in the other three sub-dimensions. While the highest score in the sub-dimension of "help in traumatic situations" belongs to the field of social sciences and humanities, the highest score in all other sub-dimensions belongs to the field of theology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 30, Number 2, November 2004, pp. 213-236 Pleased and Afflicted: Hume on the Paradox of Tragic Pleasure E. M. DADLEZ How fast can you run? As fast as a leopard. How fast are you going to run? A whistle sounds the order that sends Archie Hamilton and his comrades over the top of the trench to certain death. Racing to circumvent that order and arriving seconds (...) too late, Archie's friend Frank screams in rage and despair. Archie is cut down before he has run twenty yards. Peter Weir's film Gallipoli is a chronicle of the disastrous Dardanelles campaign of the first World War, but it is also a film about racing. Archie is trained by his uncle Jack to run "as fast as a leopard." The film begins as it ends, with Archie sprinting in response to a whistle. Frank is first shown racing after a train, along with friends who are on their way to enlist. Archie and Frank meet while competing in a race, they race in Cairo once they have enlisted, and they finally race death. From the beginning, Archie has been faster; even at the end he is the first to die. And from the beginning he has swept Frank along in his wake, encouraging him, pushing him, inspiring him, and helping him to positions for which he is inadequately qualified. In the end, Archie's compassion and kindness prompt a decision which has grim consequences both for himself and for hundreds of others. Knowing that his friend fears death in the trenches, Archie recommends Frank as a substitute for himself, a designated message runner. But Frank is not fast enough, and falls short by mere seconds which Archie would not have lost. This is what leads to the failure of the one real effort to countermand the fatal charge. E. M. Dadlez is Professor of Humanities and Philosophy, University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, OK 73034, USA. e-mail: [email protected] 214 E. M. Dadlez I am an emotional wreck by the time the movie is over, though I should admit that most of my tears are the result of sheer rage. Both my dogs exited the room in some haste once I began to shout at the television and the unpardonably dimwitted British officers who sat sipping tea at a comfortable distance as they gave the order for soldiers to commit suicide. But it isn't just the scope of the real human disaster, or the enormity of the blunder, or the pointlessness of the entire enterprise, or even my renewed conviction that stupidity is, in fact, evil, that is so unsettling. The film unnerves with respect to personal as well as global concerns, focusing attention on the chance of vanity's leading one to undertake responsibilities beyond one's competence, the possibility of advancement or security being achievable only at the expense of another, and the realization of how easy it might be to let those things happen. Gallipoli is a sad, disturbing film, and the spectator is grieved and disturbed in the course of watching it. Yet, having said that, I must own to having a copy in my possession, and to having watched it more than once. I recommend it to friends, offering to lend them my videotape. In fact, I press it on them. I say that it is a terrific, rewarding work which they should take the time to see. How is it that I can describe my experience of the film in such glowing terms and at the same time acknowledge the extreme distress I felt in the course of watching it? How can I reconcile the discordant aspects of my experience? David Hume explores some possible answers in his essay "Of Tragedy."1 He begins by calling attention to the paradox of tragic pleasure: It seems an unaccountable pleasure, which the spectators of a well written tragedy receive from sorrow, terror... and other passions, which are in themselves disagreeable and uneasy. The more they are touched and affected, the more are they delighted with the spectacle.... The whole art of the poet is employed in rousing and supporting the compassion and... (shrink)

According to the Ontology of Knowledge (OK) reality is unspeakable, it is subjected neither to form nor to time (see ref OK). The concepts of necessity and indeterminacy are central for the OK. It is important to understand their meaning in such a context. Relativity offers a model of reality: The block-universe which is not "in" time but "contains" time. The same questions of necessity and indeterminacy therefore arise, but this time in the context of a model of sayable reality. (...) Although the operational model of relativity is not an ontological model, it is in the context of relativistic space-time that we will try to understand the place left to indeterminacy. We will then try to transpose this understanding to the OK. (shrink)

We can only know what determines us as being and by the fact that it determines us as being. Our knowledge is therefore logically limited to what determines us as being. Since representation is defined as the act that makes knowledge dicible, our representation is logically limited to what dynamically determines us as being. Our representation is included in our becoming. Nothing that we represent, no infinite, can exceed the mere necessity of our becoming. The world, my physical being and (...) my consciousness are subsumed by the necessity of my becoming. We know nothing but “we become” To the question "Is there anything else to know?" we can give no logical answer -/- Summary: Reality is pure logical interdependence, immanent, formless, unspeakable. Logos is a principle of order in this interdependence. Individuation is the necessary asymptote of any instance of the Logos. Each knowing subject is Individuation, a mode of order among infinites of infinites of possible modes of order. Everything that appears to the subject as Existing participates in his Individuation. This convergence into Individuation defines a perspective that gives meaning. The subject is representation. It is in this representation that exist the subject, objects and laws of the world. Without subject there are no objects, no laws, no framework. The representation is not isomorphism but morphogenesis. The physical world and the Spirit have the same logical nature: they are categories of representation. The representation is animated because meaning is an Act. Representation is limited by a horizon of meaning. Below this horizon the subject represents the universe and itself. Beyond this horizon there is no prevailing space, time or form. The predicate expresses, below the horizon of meaning, a necessity whose source is beyond this horizon, unfathomable. The OK is neither materialism nor idealism and frees itself from any psychological preconceptions. The OK does not propose an "other reality" than that described by common sense or science, but another mode of representation. The OK is compatible with the current state of science, while offering new interpretive avenues. The OK differs from ontic structural realism (OSR) in various ways: Just like being, the relationship is representation, The knowing subject is present in any representation, the real is non-founded. (shrink)

Mass media, także i w Republice Federalnej Niemiec, zyskują coraz większe znaczenie w informowaniu i funkcjonowaniu społeczeństw. Najstarszym środkiem masowego przekazu społecznego jest prasa. Pierwsze gazety na świecie zostały wydane na początku XVII w. w Wolfenbiittel i Strasburgu, a więc na ówczesnych terenach niemieckich. Nosiły one tytuły: "Aviso" i "Relationen". Aktualnie wydaje się w Niemczech 30 milionów egzemplarzy prasy codziennej (w ogólnym nakładzie). Zwiększa się także liczba gazet zawierających programy telewizyjne oraz czasopism kobiecych. Mediami XX w. są niewątpliwie radio i (...) telewizja. Pierwsze audycje radiowe były nadawane w Niemczech w roku 1923. Nowy wynalazek zyskał wkrótce duże uznanie i już w rok później w Niemczech było zarejestrowanych ponad pół miliona odbiorników. Aktualnie w RFN działa ok. 11 radiostacji publicznych i ponad 200 prywatnych. Powstanie prywatnych stacji radiowych i telewizyjnych było możliwe dzięki rozwiązaniom technologicznym lat osiemdziesiątych. Telewizja była znana już przed II wojną światową. W roku 1935 były nadawane regularne audycje telewizyjne w Niemczech. W rok później telewizja niemiecka transmitowała igrzyska olimpijskie, które odbywały się wtedy w Berlinie. Po II wojnie światowej stworzono w RFN dwie publiczne stacje telewizyjne: ARD (1954) i ZDF (1963). Od połowy lat osiemdziesiątych poważną konkurencją dla publicznych stacji telewizyjnych jest telewizja prywatna, która przekazuje swoje programy za pośrednictwem transmisji satelitarnych i łączy kablowych. Do najbardziej znanych niemieckich stacji telewizji prywatnej, odbieranych także i w Polsce należą: RTL i SATl, a także Pro Sieben, Vox, RTL2, Premiere, Viva itd. Przyszłość elektronicznych mediów audiowizualnych, nie tylko w RFN, ale także i w innych krajach jest ogromna i rozwija się niezwykle intensywnie i dynamicznie, zaspokajając głównie potrzeby ludyczne społeczeństw. (shrink)

[issue 20211210] Qbism (quantum bayesism) is a philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) that places the agent and its expectations at the heart of theory. The QBists advocate a "subjectivist" interpretation of probabilities that allows to understand the quantum laws of Born and to eliminate certain enigmas of interpretation of the QM going "beyond" the interpretation of Copenhagen. The Ontology of Knowledge (OK) is in agreement with the main ideas of the Qbism. For the OdC indeed: -The agent is the (...) focal point of the representation -Representation is specific to the agent -There are no "states of the world" but only "states of knowledge" -There is no probability of evolution of the "state of the world" but only probabilities, for the subject, of evolution of his Knowledge. -These probabilities lead to the future actions and experiences of the agent. The aim of this article is to propose, according to the OdC, ways for an extension of the explanatory power of the QBism. (shrink)

In this article, we would like to clarify the concept of transcendental Subject according to the Ontology of Knowledge (OK), not with the idea of contradicting but with that of completing the Kantian vision. We would nevertheless like to show how Kant's lack of a true transcendence of the subject limits and disorients the development of his thought. We would finally like to trace some tracks towards new ontological (and scientific) options that the OK makes possible beyond those which the (...) Kantian critique entailed. (shrink)

Knowledge of the subject only ever speaks to the subject himself and of nothing more than the subject himself. And yet, when due to their mode of emergence, objects of this knowledge seem to occupy part of a space (whatever it may be) which would contain them, it is tempting for the subject to give this space the name of Reality. The conventional western philosophies (and science) gave in to this temptation. They came to distinguish the Subject {place-of-the-mind} from the (...) Reality {place-of-the-objects} whereas Reality is only the "objectified" or rather "objectivized" aspect of knowledge of the subject. From this artificial distinction followed a great confusion, a dispute that lasted for centuries, and still does, between different -isms with infinitesimal differences, from which the most influential parties emerge victorious each at his turn. In reaction to this confusion a "pivotal" re-orientation is suggested, considering the way objects of knowledge emerge and are organized, not in correlation with objects of Reality but with the subject for himself and knowledge for itself. For this re-orientation the OK proposes to transcend the subject's mind to reveal its logical principles. That's the specific subject I would like to delve into here : the transcendence of meaning. This is necessary for understanding the OK and could be beneficial to “mental health counseling”. (shrink)

Poniższa praca odnosi się głównie do tezy Huberta Orłowskiego, według której „niemiecka dyskusja o Polsce miała legitymujące, nic do pominięcia znaczenie dla wynalezienia niemieckiego narodu”. Wobec rozmiarów i rozdrobnienia społeczno-wyznaniowego Rzeszy Niemieckiej ok. 1700 r. temat ten ograniczony jest do Prus Zachodnich i głównego problemu (teoria państwowości, religia, historia) debaty o przyczynach funkcjonowania powstałego obrazu Polski. Koncentracja na Prusach Zachodnich wynika z modalnego charakteru, jaki musiał mieć „problem Polski” jako odzwierciedlenie procesów tworzenia się granic na danym obszarze, którego niemiecki rejon (...) kulturalny miał polską przynależność państwową. Przedstawia się tu sposób, w jaki nowa, w dyskusyjnych ramach europejskiego wczesnego Oświecenia powstająca świadomość wnosiła stopniowy odwrót od rozpadającej się polskiej Republiki Szlacheckiej, a tym samym konieczność poszukiwania nowej władzy ochronnej. Wynikała z tego pewna opcja narodowa, która następnie zmieniła regionalnie obraz Polski. Ta trafnie podkreślana przez Orłowskiego konccplualizacja obrazu Polski służyła do przekształcenia stanowo uformowanej boruskiej świadomości regionalnej w nowożytną (pozytywnie lub negatywnie) skupioną na Prusach świadomość państwową. Punktem wyjścia poniższych rozważań jest spór o to, czy forma państwa polskiej Republiki Szlacheckiej w drugiej połowie XVII w. mogła jeszcze być wystarczającą dla ekonomicznych i politycznych potrzeb mieszczaństwa. Rozważania te wskazują zarówno z obcej jak też z własnej perspektywy na ten w tamtym okresie z mieszczańskiego punktu widzenia mało atrakcyjny obraz Polski. Obcy znaczy tu jednak nie tyle trochę specyficzny „polski”, ile nie do zaakceptowania jako patriotyczny i nierozsądny ekonomicznie dla mieszczanina sposób postępowania polskiego szlachcica. W tymże sensie informuje zrekonstruowana tu debata o wczesnym mieszczańskim (nie zabarwionym jeszcze narodowo) obrazie Polski. Przedstawia ona jednocześnie, w jak wielkim stopniu konstruowany był portret własny mieszczaństwa w kulturalnie niemiecko ukształtowanych miastach Polski, według etosu protestanckiego w przeciwieństwie do katolickiej szlachty polskiej. Rozwijający się z tego późny pruski obraz Polski jest następnie podejmowany jako kompleks dalej działających i umacniających się uprzedzeń, które powstają na początku XVIII w. i oddzielają się stopniowo od ich prawdziwych kulis. Jako stereotyp ma to więc swoje korzenie w przeciwieństwie mieszczańsko-boruskich i polskich, skierowanych na konstelacje władzy w Republice Szlacheckiej interesów i poczynań. Teza ta uwidacznia też, że nie chodziło tylko o opis stereotypowej struktury dziś rozprzestrzenionych opinii o Polsce. Dużo większe zainteresowanie skierowane zostało na „ziarenko prawdy” , które, z historycznego punktu widzenia, zawarte jest w każdym stereotypie. (shrink)

Graduates' employability indicates the excellent education and relevant preparation they obtained from their respective degrees. Tracer studies have enabled higher education institutions to profile their graduates while also reflecting on the quality of education they provide. With the foregoing, a tracer study determined the demographic and academic profile of teacher education graduates from 2017 to 2020 in a state university in the West Philippines. It also ascertained the advanced studies they attended after college, their employment data, the relevance of college (...) preparation with their current employment, difficulties they encountered while securing employment and in their present job, and recommendations to strengthen the teacher education program. The study utilized a descriptive survey research design with 80 non-random samples chosen based on availability. The survey was based on the Philippine Commission on Higher Education with modifications elucidated from previous studies. Results showed that graduates took the teacher education program with a strong passion for the teaching profession. More graduates received honors and awards, passed the licensure examinations for teachers, attended advanced studies for professional development, and are employable. Besides, the graduates’ college preparation is relevant to their current employment. Further, difficulties and problems encountered and recommendations to strengthen the teacher education program were noted. These findings may serve as a baseline for curriculum review and give suggestions for future tracer studies. (shrink)

Bilim felsefesinin en temel problemlerinden biri olan sınırlandırma problemi belirli bir ölçüt vasıtası ile bilimi, bilimsel olmayan ya da sahte/sözde bilim olan etkinliklerden ayırt edip edemeyeceğimizi konu edinmektedir. Literatüre baktığımızda felsefeciler –özellikle bilim felsefecileri– bilimin doğasını karakterize etme girişiminde bulunurken bilim dilinin mantıksal yapısına ya da bilimin tarihsel süreçlerine odaklanarak, bilimi bilimsel olmayan ya da sahte-bilim olan etkinliklerden ayırt etmişlerdir. Bu çalışma ise farklı bir yaklaşım benimseyerek sınırlandırma problemine, felsefecilerin değil, bilim insanlarının perspektifi ile bakmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu sebeple alanında deneyimli (...) ve çeşitli bilim dallarında profesör olan otuz bilim insanı ile niteliksel araştırma yöntemlerinden biri olan yapılandırılmış görüşme tekniği uygulanmıştır. Bu görüşmeler aracılığıyla bilim insanlarının sınırlandırma problemi hususunda öne sürdükleri görüşler açığa çıkartılıp değerlendirilmiştir. Değerlendirme neticesinde üç temel bulguya ulaşılmıştır. İlki, sınırlandırma problemine ilişkin sorularımıza bilim insanları tarafından getirilen yanıtların birçoğu temel felsefi yaklaşımlarla uyuşmaktadır. Elde ettiğimiz verileri farklı temalar altında analiz ettiğimiz bu çalışmada, sınırlandırma problemine dair yaygın felsefi görüşlerin, bilim insanlarının görüşleri ile anlamlı benzerlikler taşıdığı kısımlar vurgulanmıştır. İkincisi, sınırlandırma problemi ve bu problemlerle ilişkili diğer meseleler üzerinde felsefi olarak sağlanamayan uzlaşma, bilim insanları arasında da mevcuttur. Ne var ki bu ihtilaf dengeli bir biçimdedir, öyle ki benzer yanıtlara sahip olan bilim insanları baskın bir grup sayısına ulaşmamıştır. Üçüncü ve son olarak, bilim insanlarının bilim felsefesinin temel problemlerine yüksek oranda yabancı olduğu görülmektedir. Bu bulgu, her ne kadar nicel olmayan bir yolla ölçülmüşse de verilerin dikkatli analizi durumun bu yönde olduğunu göstermektedir. Tüm bu temel bulgular ışığında, genel değerlendirmemiz, farklı türden yapılandırılmış görüşmelerin çok daha detaylı sonuçlar temin edebileceğidir. (shrink)

In this context, the study explored the relationship between organizational climate and employee innovative work behaviour among food manufacturing industries in Malaysia. The study is a descriptive correlational survey research design where data is sourced out from a total of randomly sampled 260 employees. Results revealed that a favourable organizational climate on innovation, proactivity, and risk-taking is prevailing among the companies. A very high level of innovative work behaviour is emanating among the employees on idea exploration, generation, championing, and implementation. (...) Test of differences showed that employee gender, position, unit, and years of service spelt significant differences in the perception of the employees on organizational climate and innovative work behaviour. A meaningful relationship surfaced between organizational climate and employee innovative work behaviour, suggesting that for food manufacturing industries to sustain innovative and competitive advantages, there is a need to promote a nurturing and encouraging entrepreneurial organizational climate. Finally, a congruency among the domains of organizational climate and employee innovative work behaviour emerged. It suggests that when higher positive organizational climate surfaces, the more likely the employee's manifest innovation work behaviour. This study addressed the gap by providing organizational climate and employee innovative work behaviour among food manufacturing industries in Malaysia. (shrink)

The Eugenic Mind Project is a wide-ranging, philosophical book that explores and critiques both past and present eugenic thinking, drawing on the author’s intimate knowledge of eugenics in North America and his previous work on the cognitive, biological, and social sciences, the fragile sciences. Informed by the perspectives of Canadian eugenics survivors in the province of Alberta, The Eugenic Mind Project recounts the history of eugenics and the thinking that drove it, and critically engages contemporary manifestations of eugenic thought, newgenics. (...) An accessible, original work of scholarship adopting what the author calls a standpoint eugenics, this book focuses on the roots of eugenic thinking past and present. It will provoke and enrich discussions about human nature and human diversity, the social uses of biotechnology, and social policy governing future generations. You can download the preface and acknowledgements here. (shrink)

The impressive variation amongst biological individuals generates many complexities in addressing the simple-sounding question what is a biological individual? A distinction between evolutionary and physiological individuals is useful in thinking about biological individuals, as is attention to the kinds of groups, such as superorganisms and species, that have sometimes been thought of as biological individuals. More fully understanding the conceptual space that biological individuals occupy also involves considering a range of other concepts, such as life, reproduction, and agency. There has (...) been a focus in some recent discussions by both philosophers and biologists on how evolutionary individuals are created and regulated, as well as continuing work on the evolution of individuality. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between eugenics, disability, and dehumanization, with a focus on forms of eugenics beyond Nazi eugenics.

The conceptualisation of kinship and its study remain contested within anthropology. This paper draws on recent cognitive science, developmental cognitive psychology, and the philosophy of science to offer a novel argument for a view of kinship as progeneratively or reproductively constrained. I shall argue that kinship involves a form of extended cognition that incorporates progenerative facts, going on to show how the resulting articulation of kinship’s progenerative nature can be readily expressed by an influential conception of kinds, the homeostatic property (...) cluster view. Identifying the distinctive role that our extended cognitive access to progenerative facts plays in kinship delivers an integrative, progenerativist view that avoids standard performativist criticisms of progenerativism as being ethnocentric, epistemically naïve, and reductive. (shrink)

This volume of twelve specially commissioned essays about species draws on the perspectives of prominent researchers from anthropology , botany, developmental psychology , the philosophy of biology and science, protozoology, and zoology . The concept of species has played a focal role in both evolutionary biology and the philosophy of biology , and the last decade has seen something of a publication boom on the topic (e.g., Otte and Endler 1989; Ereshefsky 1992b; Paterson 1994; lambert and Spence 1995; Claridge, Dawah, (...) and Wilson 1997; Wheeler and Meier 1999; Howard and Berlocher 1998). (shrink)

Philosophers of biology and biologists themselves for the most part assume that the concept of kin is progenerative: what makes two individuals kin is a direct or indirect function of reproduction. Derivatively, kinship might likewise be presumed to be progenerative in nature. Yet a prominent view of kinship in contemporary cultural anthropology is a kind of constructivism or performativism that rejects such progenerativist views. This paper critically examines an influential line of thinking used to critique progenerativism and support performativism that (...) cites cross-cultural diversity in what I will call kinmaking. I challenge several key assumptions made in moving from this appeal to ethnography to conclusions about kinship and progeneration, arguing that closer scrutiny of both the ethnographic record and inferences that draw on it in fact support progenerative views of both kinship and kinmaking. (shrink)

Vision constitutes an interesting domain, or range of domains, for debate over the extended mind thesis, the idea that minds physically extend beyond the boundaries of the body. In part this is because vision and visual experience more particularly are sometimes presented as a kind of line in the sand for what we might call externalist creep about the mind: once all reasonable concessions have been made to externalists about the mind, visual experience marks a line beyond which lies a (...) safe haven for individualists. Here I want to put a little more pressure on such a view of visual experience, as well as to offer a more constructive, positive argument in defense of the idea of extended vision. (shrink)

The Westermarck Effect posits that intimate association during childhood promotes human incest avoidance. In previous work, I articulated and defended a version of the Westermarck Effect by developing a phylogenetic argument that has purchase within primatology but that has had more limited appeal for cultural anthropologists due to their commitment to conventionalist or culture-first accounts of incest avoidance. Here I look to advance the discussion of incest and incest avoidance beyond culture-first accounts in two ways. First, I shall dig deeper (...) into the disciplinary grooves within cultural anthropology that make attractive the view that incest has a naturalness to it that is countered only or primarily by explicit social rules, such as taboos. Second, I further explore the emerging, post-conventionalist view of incest avoidance in a more positive vein by elaborating on the nature of the Westermarckian mechanism and how it relates to such explicit social rules and our innate biological endowments. One general aim here is to overcome the bifurcation between perspectives that are seen as biological and those seen as cultural, preempting or countering the claim that rejecting culture-first accounts entails a form of biological reductionism, a general aim I have pursued in related publications on bioessentialism about kinship. (shrink)

Düşünce deneylerinden beklenen şeylerden biri de mevcut bilgimizi test etmesi ya da bilgimizi artırmasıdır. Ancak adından da kolayca anlaşılacağı gibi, yalnızca düşüncede yürütülen böyle bir deney, örneğin bize ne şekilde yeni bir bilgi sağlayabilir? Bu zamana kadar söz konusu soruya, bilim felsefesi literatüründe, başlıca beş temel yanıt verilmiştir. Bu makalede, tüm bu yaklaşımların -Platoncu yaklaşım hariç- ortak bir varsayımını ele alacağım. Bu varsayıma göre düşünce deneylerinin tüm yönlerini açıklayabilecek kapsayıcı bir teori bulunmaktadır. Düşünce deneylerinin doğasına ilişkin bu tekçi varsayım, en (...) azından iki yönden oldukça sorunlu görünmektedir. İlk olarak, belirli bir düşünce deneyinin tek bir yaklaşımla açıklanamayan yönleri bulunmaktadır. İkincisi, şimdiye kadar önerilen yaklaşımlar tüm düşünce deneylerini açıklayamamaktadır. Bu iddiaları temellendirmek ve bahsedilen yaklaşımların eksikliklerini belirtmek için Galileo’nun ve Darwin’in öne sürdüğü düşünce deneyi örneklerini ele alacağım. Son olarak çoğulcu bir yaklaşımın düşünce deneylerinin doğasını açıklamada çok daha uygun bir çerçeve sağladığını öne süreceğim. (shrink)

This paper begins by saying enough about eugenics to explain why disability is central to eugenics (section 2), then elaborates on why cognitive disability has played and continues to play a special role in eugenics and in thinking about moral status (section 3) before identifying three reasons why eugenics remains a live issue in contemporary bioethics (section 4). After a reminder of the connections between Nazi eugenics, medicine, and bioethics (section 5), it returns to take up two more specific clusters (...) of issues at the intersection of eugenics, disability, and bioethics. These concern questions of life, death, and reproductive value (section 6) and the value of standpoint theory and epistemology for understanding some of the tensions between bioethics and disability in light of a shared eugenic past (section 7). (shrink)

Zihin–beden problemi felsefenin en köklü ve temel problemlerinden biridir. Köklü geçmişine rağmen probleme getirilen yanıtlar hususunda felsefe literatüründe bütünüyle bir uzlaşımın olmadığını söylemek ise pekâlâ mümkündür. Zihin–beden problemi en basit haliyle şöyle ifade edilebilir: Birbirinden her özelliği ile ayrılan zihin ve beden birbirlerini etkiler mi ve eğer etkiler ise bu etkileşim nasıl olmaktadır? Neredeyse her felsefi mesele gibi, zihin–beden probleminin geçmişi de Antik Grek felsefesine kadar götürülebilir. Ancak söz konusu problem ile ilgili yapılmış detaylı çalışmalar ilk olarak rasyonalist filozoflar tarafından (...) yapılmıştır ve daha sonra empirist felsefeye doğru genişlemiştir. Bu yazıda ilk kesim filozofların, yani rasyonalistlerin, problemi ortaya koyuş biçimleri ve söz konusu probleme getirmiş oldukları yaklaşımlar incelenecektir. Bunu yaparken dört temel rasyonalist filozofun argümanları analiz edilecektir. Daha detaylı bir ifadeyle, bu yazının konusu Descartes’ın, Malebranche’ın, Spinoza’nın ve Leibniz’in zihin–beden problemine sunmuş oldukları çözüm önerilerini incelemek olacaktır. Son kısımda ele almış olduğum dört filozofun felsefi pozisyonlarındaki farklılıklara kısaca değinilecek, zihin–beden probleminin çeşitli implikasyonları ele alınıp güncel felsefedeki problemler ile bağlantısı gösterilecektir. (shrink)

I think there is something to be said in a positive and constructive vein about collective intentionality in non-human animals. Doing so involves probing at the concept of collective intentionality fairly directly (Section 2), considering the various forms that collective intentionality might take (Section 3), showing some sensitivity to the history of appeals to that concept and its close relatives (Section 4), and raising some broader questions about the relationships between sociality, cognition, and institutions by discussing two different possible cases (...) of collective intentionality in non-human animals: that of the social insects (Section 5) and that of highly social mammals, such as canines (Section 6). If the discussion here is on track, then the widely shared perspective on collective intentionality exemplified by the work of Searle and Tomasello needs to be reconsidered. (shrink)

This commentary continues an exchange on eugenics in Monash Bioethics Review between Anomaly (2018), Wilson (2019), and Veit, Anomaly, Agar, Singer, Fleischman, and Minerva (2021). The eponymous question, “Can ‘Eugenics’ be Defended?”, is multiply ambiguous and does not receive a clear answer from Veit et al.. Despite their stated desire to move beyond mere semantics to matters of substance, Veit et al. concentrate on several uses of the term “eugenics” that pull in opposite directions. I argue, first, that Veit et (...) al. (2021) makes much the same error as does Anomaly (2018) in characterizing eugenics; second, that the paper misunderstands the relationship between eugenics and enhancement; and third, that it distorts the views expressed in my “Eugenics Undefended”. (shrink)

Eugenics does not feel so distant from where I stand. This essay explains why.

The dual role of olfaction in both smelling and tasting, i.e. flavour perception, makes it an important test case for philosophical theories of sensory individuation. Indeed, the psychologist Paul Rozin claimed that olfaction is a “dual sense”, leading some scientists and philosophers to propose that we have not one, but two senses of smell: orthonasal and retronasal olfaction. In this paper I consider how best to understand Rozin’s claim, and upon what grounds one might judge there to be one or (...) two distinct olfactory modalities. I conclude that while Rozin may be right that humans have dual occurrences of an olfactory ‘sense’, the concept of a sense-modality, and hence the ‘sense’ of smell, is ambiguous between two different notions: a physiological sensory channel and an experiential modality, along the lines suggested by J. J. Gibson. Furthermore, recognising that these are complementary rather than competing conceptions of a sense-modality enables the formulation of a powerful ‘dual-concept’ framework for posing and addressing questions concerning the complex architecture of human multisensory experience. (shrink)

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 1, Page 33-56, March 2021.

This short article provides an overview of the series of eugenic family studies that began in the 1870s in the United States and that were influential in establishing eugenics as a 20th-century movement and ideology.

This afterword to Species and Beyond provides some reflections on species, with special attention to what I think the most significant developments have been in the thinking of biologists and philosophers working on species over the past 25 years, as well as some bad jokes.

This chapter steps back from the important psychological work on collaborative remembering at the heart of the present volume to take up some broader questions about the place of memory in Western cultural thought, both historically and in contemporary society, offering the kind of integrative and reflective perspective for which philosophy is often known. In particular, the text aims to shed some light on the relationship between collaborative memory and the other two topics in this title—group-level cognizing and individuals—beginning with (...) the relationship between collective intentionality and collaborative remembering, and concluding with some brief comments on the politics of collaborative remembering by drawing on recent work that has been undertaken with eugenics survivors in Canada. (shrink)